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MISSION CREEP AND WIRETAP ACT ‘SUPER 
WARRANTS’: A CAUTIONARY TALE 
Jennifer S. Granick,* Patrick Toomey,** Naomi Gilens*** & 
Daniel Yadron, Jr.**** 
 
 Congress enacted the Wiretap Act in 1968 in an effort to combat 
organized crime while safeguarding the privacy of innocent 
Americans. However, the Act instead served to legitimize wiretapping, 
and its privacy protections have eroded over time. As a result, there 
has been a significant increase in wiretapping in the decades since the 
Act’s passage. As technology evolves, the Wiretap Act does less to 
protect Americans’ private communications from government 
interception. Nevertheless, policy makers see the Wiretap Act, with its 
“super-warrant” procedures, as the gold standard for statutory 
privacy protection. To the contrary, when considering how to regulate 
new and powerful surveillance technologies, advocates must not 
reflexively rely on the language of the Wiretap Act as a model for 
adequate privacy safeguards. They must consider whether, given the 
Act’s apparent flaws, it is possible to meaningfully balance the 
invasiveness of a new technique with the preservation of individual 
privacy. If so, drafters should focus on crafting statutory language 
that better implements the intended safeguards of the Act than the Act 
itself has. This Article describes the deterioration of the Wiretap Act’s 
protections and should serve as a cautionary tale to advocates as they 
propose new legislation in the face of modern surveillance tools.  
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INTRODUCTION 
As new surveillance capabilities proliferate, civil liberties 
advocates strive to protect individuals’ privacy rights in the face of 
novel and intrusive investigative tools. Often, advocates hold up the 
“super warrant” procedures required to conduct a wiretap as the gold 
standard for strong privacy protections. A review of the history of the 
Wiretap Act, however, shows that even a super warrant can fail to 
adequately protect privacy in the face of new surveillance techniques. 
Advocates need to think more broadly about additional safeguards. 
And, some investigative techniques may be so dangerous that there are 
no regulations that could balance their invasiveness with civil liberties 
and the public’s safety. 
The Wiretap Act (Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968, also called “Title III”) requires a super 
warrant to authorize government wiretapping. In addition to the 
traditional warrant requirements of probable cause and particularity, 
Title III limits wiretapping to investigations of certain predicate 
offenses; it requires that investigators show necessity; and it mandates 
minimization of intercepted communications. Often, advocates see 
these additional Title III elements as providing strong protection for 
personal civil liberties. However, the evolution of Title III’s 
protections and the exponential growth of wiretapping is a cautionary 
tale. More skepticism about the adequacy of a Title III “super-
warrant” requirement is warranted. 
This Article assesses the conditions and frequency of wiretapping 
before and after Congress passed Title III. Part I describes how 
wiretaps were used, and how they were regulated, in the decades 
leading up to Congress’s passage of Title III. Part II assesses 
Congress’s purpose in passing Title III. Using both qualitative 
assessments and historical wiretap data, Part III assesses how law 
enforcement’s use of wiretapping changed following Title III’s 
passage. Part IV examines how Title III’s privacy-protective measures 
have developed and functioned in practice over the past five decades. 
The lesson that emerges from this survey is significant. Though 
intended to provide a set of strong privacy protections that would limit 
wiretapping to only the most serious investigations, and would ensure 
that it was used only as a tool of last resort, Title III legitimized a 
practice that President Lyndon B. Johnson, many lawmakers, and the 
ACLU wanted to outlaw in all but the most sensitive national security 
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investigations. The data available and qualitative assessments suggest 
that wiretapping became exponentially more common after 1968. 
Moreover, the privacy safeguards imposed by Congress in Title III 
have eroded over time or have been demonstrably less effective than 
initially imagined. Title III may not be the cause of this dramatic 
increase in law enforcement’s reliance on wiretapping, but it didn’t 
prevent it, either. 
Privacy advocates therefore cannot be confident that a Title III 
warrant requirement always will be an adequate safeguard. Currently, 
the Wiretap Act is falling short of the goal of constraining 
eavesdropping. Privacy-seeking proposals will have to take the 
failures of the current statutory regime into account. It will be difficult 
to ensure that regulation will stop invasive law enforcement 
techniques from metastasizing over time. Civil libertarians need to 
look beyond the current language of Title III for additional or different 
tools to constrain invasive surveillance. 
DISCUSSION 
I.  WIRETAPPING WAS SPORADIC AND CONTROVERSIAL 
BEFORE TITLE III 
This Part assesses the frequency and conditions of wiretapping 
before Title III. First, it assesses government wiretapping policies 
before 1968. Second, it provides an overview of efforts by President 
Johnson, lawmakers, and the ACLU to outlaw wiretapping for all but 
the most serious national security investigations. Ultimately, through 
Title III, Congress sought to serve law enforcement needs while 
mitigating widespread privacy concerns about wiretaps by 
regulating—rather than banning—the invasive investigatory tool. 
Nevertheless, the regulations have not stopped wiretapping from 
becoming a widely-used investigation technique. 
A.  1928–1946: Wiretapping Grows Through a Loophole 
Warrantless federal wiretapping grew in fits and starts during the 
first half of the twentieth century. To some extent, its use depended 
“on the personal convictions of those in office.”1 Though federal 
 
 1. NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE REVIEW OF FED. & STATE LAWS RELATING TO WIRETAPPING 
& ELEC. SURVEILLANCE, NWC REPORT at 36 (Apr. 30, 1976), 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=728874 [hereinafter NWC Report]. 
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agents had used wiretapping to track down bootleggers,2 in early 1928, 
Attorney General John G. Sargent prohibited agents at the Bureau of 
Investigation—the precursor to the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI)—from wiretapping for “any reason.”3 Months later, the U.S. 
Supreme Court, in Olmstead v. United States,4 held that wiretapping 
did not constitute “a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.”5 Although the Court invited Congress to prohibit 
wiretapping via statute,6 lawmakers did not immediately do so.7 
Not long after, in 1931, the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
announced a new policy allowing agents to wiretap, provided that they 
obtain a bureau chief’s approval, “after consultation with the assistant 
attorney general (AAG) in charge of that case,”8 and show probable 
cause (at least internally).9 The policy was intended for use in 
investigations targeting “syndicated bootleggers,”10 but mission creep 
appeared by year’s end. In December 1931, Attorney General William 
D. Mitchell expanded wiretapping to “exceptional cases where the 
crimes are substantial and serious, and the necessity is great.”11 The 
bureau chief and AAG on the case also needed to be satisfied that “the 
persons whose wires are to be tapped are of the criminal type.”12 This 
DOJ policy lasted for the remainder of the 1930s.13 
During this period, Congress passed the Federal Communications 
Act of 1934.14 The Communications Act prohibited persons from 
intercepting communications or divulging or publishing the contents 
of intercepted communications, except with authorization by the 
 
 2. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in part by Berger v. 
New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 3. NWC Report, supra note 1, at 35. 
 4. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 5. Id. at 466. 
 6. Id. at 465. 
 7. NWC Report, supra note 1, at 35 (“Bills were introduced in Congress in 1929 and 1931 
to prohibit wiretapping, but were never enacted.”). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. n.22 (citing Intelligence Activities Senate Resolution 21: Hearing on the National 
Security Agency and Fourth Amendment Rights Before the S. Select Comm. to Study Governmental 
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong. 67 (1975) (prepared statement of 
Edward H. Levi, Att’y Gen. of the United States)). 
 13. NWC Report, supra note 1, at 35. 
 14. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1934). 
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sender.15 The Communications Act did not explicitly address 
wiretapping by law enforcement specifically.16 In Nardone v. United 
States,17 the Supreme Court interpreted it to prohibit government 
agents from intercepting communications as well.18 Speaking in moral 
terms, the Court held that the statute applied to federal agents, in part 
because “[f]or years controversy has raged with respect to the morality 
of the practice of wire-tapping by officers to obtain evidence. It has 
been the view of many that the practice involves a grave wrong.”19 
The Court doubled down two years later, holding that evidence 
derived from intercepted communications was inadmissible at trial.20 
By 1940, Attorney General Robert H. Jackson again completely 
banned wiretapping by federal agents, describing it as an “unethical 
tactic[].”21 
The pause in eavesdropping was short-lived.22 In May 1940, 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote Jackson a confidential memo 
arguing that the Nardone decisions did not apply to national security 
investigations.23 Roosevelt then authorized DOJ to use wiretapping in 
investigations of alleged “subversive activities of the United States 
government,” asking Jackson to limit the investigations “insofar as 
possible to aliens.”24 A year later, Jackson—just before his nomination 
to the Supreme Court—informed Congress of a statutory loophole 
DOJ had exploited.25 The Communications Act, Jackson wrote, only 
proscribed divulging intercepted communications—not collecting 
intercepted communications.26 DOJ policy post-Nardone was to use 
wiretapping for intelligence purposes.27 
DOJ wiretaps grew quickly during World War II. DOJ conducted 
six wiretaps in 1940.28 In 1944: 517.29 Though initially justified by 
 
 15. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2012). 
 16. NWC Report, supra note 1, at 35. 
 17. 302 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 18. Id. at 384. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Nardone v. United States (Nardone II), 308 U.S. 338, 340–41 (1939). 
 21. NWC Report, supra note 1, at 36. 
 22. Id. (“This total ban lasted only about two months, however.”). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1934)). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
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wartime needs, wiretapping did not go away when the war ended. In 
1946, Attorney General Tom C. Clark—another future Supreme Court 
Justice—warned President Harry Truman of a “very substantial 
increase in crime.”30 He proposed expanding federal wiretaps to cases 
“vitally affecting the domestic security, or where human life is in 
jeopardy.”31 Truman approved the proposal set forth in Clark’s 
letter.32 
B.  1956–1967: The Public and the President 
Revolt Against Wiretapping 
Between World War II and the passage of Title III, government 
wiretapping faced such a backlash that it was nearly outlawed.33 In 
1956, the Pennsylvania Bar Association Endowment commissioned a 
nationwide study of “wiretapping practices, laws, devices, and 
techniques.”34 The study’s authors went on to write The 
Eavesdroppers, a 1959 nonfiction best-seller that convinced many 
Americans that “in some ways Orwell’s fictitious world is already in 
existence.”35 The book detailed how telephone companies voluntarily 
provided secret wiretaps in “Boston, Chicago, and New Orleans, with 
the understanding that the police would not disclose the telephone 
companies’ cooperation to the public.”36 Still the number of 
wiretaps—at least at the federal level—remained relatively stable 
during this period.37 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id.; see also Trevor W. Morrison, The Story of United States v. United States District Court 
(Keith): The Surveillance Power, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 287 (Christopher H. Schroeder 
& Curtis A. Bradley, eds. 2008) (citing Letter from Tom C. Clark, Att’y Gen. to President Harry S. 
Truman (Jul. 17, 1946)). Truman’s handwritten approval, appended to the bottom of Clark’s letter, 
is dated July 17, 1947. That seems to have been an error. Cf. United States v. United States District 
Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 310 (1972) (treating 1946 as the date of Truman’s authorization). 
 33. NWC Report, supra note 1, at 38–39. 
 34. Brian Hochman, Eavesdropping in the Age of The Eavesdroppers; or, The Bug in the 
Martini Olive, POST45 (Feb. 3, 2016), http://post45.research.yale.edu/2016/02/eavesdropping-in-
the-age-of-the-eavesdroppers-or-the-bug-in-the-martini-olive/. 
 35. Mairi MacInnes, The Eavesdroppers, by Samuel Dash, Robert E. Knowlton, and Richard 
F. Schwartz, COMMENTARY (Mar. 1960), https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/the-
eavesdroppers-by-samuel-dash-robert-e-knowlton-and-richard-f-schwartz/. 
 36. Brief for the Rutherford Institute as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9, Dahda v. 
United States, 138 S. Ct. 1491 (2018) (No. 17-43). 
 37. Federal agents initiated 285 wiretaps in 1952, 300 wiretaps in 1953, and 322 wiretaps in 
1954. Electronic Surveillance Within the United States for Foreign Intelligence Purposes: Hearing 
Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 94th Cong. 86 (1975) (testimony of Edward H. Levi, 
Att’y Gen. of the United States), 
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In the meantime, the Supreme Court again limited the use of 
wiretapping in federal courts.38 While the fruits of federal wiretapping 
remained inadmissible under Nardone, federal agents had developed 
a workaround. Many states, most famously New York, had permissive 
government wiretap statutes. Because Nardone did not apply to the 
states, federal prosecutors had started using evidence from state 
wiretaps in federal courts.39 In 1957, the Court held this, too, was 
unlawful.40 
During the late 1950s, California, Florida, Indiana, Illinois, and 
New Jersey either banned wiretapping or “made moves to shore up old 
statutes that had the same effect.”41 In 1965, President Johnson 
reinstated a ban on federal wiretapping barring a threat to national 
security and approval from the Attorney General.42 
To be sure, eavesdropping had support during this era. Many in 
law enforcement and the Kennedy Administration supported 
wiretapping, at least in the context of organized crime.43 The 
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of 
Justice famously said restrictive wiretapping laws were “intolerable” 
because of the telephone’s “relatively free use” by mobsters.44 New 
York, in the meantime, had made prodigious use of its own state 
wiretap statute. In 1962, the District Attorney of New York told 
Congress “that ‘without [wiretaps] my own office could not have 
convicted’ ‘top figures in the underworld.’”45 
In 1967, however, three key things happened that created a real 
prospect of a United States free from prolific government wiretapping. 
First, President Johnson proposed in his State of the Union address 
that the U.S. “should outlaw all wiretapping—public and private—
 
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/hearings/94electronic_surveillance.pdf 
[hereinafter Levi Testimony]. 
 38. NWC Report, supra note 1, at 37–38. 
 39. See Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 97 (1957) (“The question presented by 
petitioner is whether evidence obtained as the result of wiretapping by state law-enforcement 
officers, without participation by federal authorities, is admissible in a federal court.”). 
 40. Id. at 105–06. 
 41. Hochman, supra note 34. 
 42. NWC Report, supra note 1, at 39; see also Levi Testimony, supra note 37, at 87 (stating 
that nonconsensual wiretapping is permitted in national security investigations with consent of the 
Attorney General). 
 43. NWC Report, supra 1, at 39. 
 44. PRES. COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF 
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 201, 203 (1967), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/42.pdf. 
 45. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 61 (1967) (quoting Congressional testimony). 
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wherever and whenever it occurs, except when the security of this 
Nation itself is at stake—and only then with the strictest governmental 
safeguards.”46 
Second, the Johnson Administration then proposed and lobbied 
for a national ban on government wiretapping—state and federal—
through the Right of Privacy Act of 1967.47 There is reason to believe 
the Act’s supporters were centrists on privacy. The American Civil 
Liberties Union expressed “strong reservations” due to the Right of 
Privacy Act’s national security exception.48 
Third, in Berger v. New York,49 the Supreme Court struck down 
New York’s wiretap statute.50 The New York wiretap law’s privacy 
controls were lax by contemporaneous standards. Officers needed 
court approval, but they only had to show “reasonable grounds to 
believe they could find evidence of crime,” rather than probable 
cause.51 Police could use the tactic to investigate any crime.52 The law 
also allowed officers to extend a two-month wiretap based on a 
showing of the “public interest.”53 The Court also faulted the statute 
for not requiring officers to “‘particularly describ[e]’ the 
communications, conversations, or discussions to be seized.”54 Six 
months after Berger, the Court decided Katz v. United States,55 
explicitly holding that an individual has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his conversations.56 The Court reiterated what the 
government would need to do to justify this incursion.57 In this way, 
the Court effectively laid out a blueprint for Congress to permit and 
regulate wiretapping consistent with the Fourth Amendment. 
 
 46. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 2–14 (Jan. 10, 
1967). 
 47. H.R. 5386, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2514 (1967). 
 48. The ACLU, for instance, lobbied against the national security exception and argued it at 
least should be more narrowly defined. House Rewrites and Passes Safe Streets Bill, CONG, Q. 
ALMANAC (1967), http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal67-1313006. Congressional media 
quoted an ACLU spokesman as saying, “a strike by the Teamsters or the steel industry could be 
held by a court to imperil national security, under the Taft-Hartley Act.” Id. 
 49. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
 50. Id. at 64. 
 51. Id. at 54. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 59. 
 54. Id. 
 55. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 56. Id. at 351–53. 
 57. Id. at 355. 
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II.  CONGRESS PASSED TITLE III TO EMBRACE WIRETAPPING 
FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES 
A.  Passage of Title III 
In 1968, responding to these developments, Congress enacted 
Title III. It appears Congress felt squeezed between “being urged to 
authorize eavesdropping in order to combat crime” and 
“counterpressures to ban it in order to protect privacy.”58 Title III, 
therefore, “was enacted as a compromise” between a “total ban on 
electronic surveillance” and lax “limit[s] [on] the use of a technique 
claimed by many to be a vital tool in fighting crime.”59 Though the 
“major purpose of Title III is to combat organized crime,”60 Congress 
identified one of the Act’s purposes as “safeguard[ing] the privacy of 
innocent persons” by placing the issuance of wiretap orders under the 
continuing supervision of the courts and limiting their use to “certain 
major types of offenses and specific categories of crimes with 
assurances that the interception is justified and that the information 
obtained thereby will not be misused.”61 
The key elements of Title III include: 
• The statute generally prohibits interception of wire or 
radio communications without a warrant.62 
• To obtain a warrant, investigators must show probable 
cause that the interception will provide evidence that “an 
individual is committing, has committed, or is about to 
commit a particular offense.”63 
• In addition, investigators must show “necessity”: that they 
have already tried other investigative means and failed or 
that such techniques are likely to be unsuccessful or too 
dangerous.64 
• The statute authorizes the use of wiretaps only in 
investigations of certain offenses, as listed.65 
 
 58. EDITH J. LAPIDUS, EAVESDROPPING ON TRIAL 13 (1974). 
 59. NWC Report, supra note 1, at xiii. 
 60. S. REP. NO. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2157. 
 61. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, § 801(d). 
 62. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012). 
 63. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3). 
 64. Id. § 2518(1)(c). 
 65. Id. § 2516. 
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• The statute requires investigators to “minimize” 
communications overheard in the course of a wiretap—
that is, to avoid recording, collecting, or retaining 
innocent or irrelevant conversations.66 
• The statute requires the government to provide notice of 
wiretaps in various circumstances, in order to inform 
individuals when the government has intruded on their 
private communications.67 
• The statute provides a mandatory suppression remedy for 
violations of the wiretapping requirements.68 
• The statute also provides civil remedies for violations.69 
Though enacted as a compromise, Title III legitimized and 
normalized wiretapping as a tool in ordinary criminal investigations.70 
As Senators Hart and Long wrote in their portion of the Senate Report, 
“the proposed legislation legitimize[d] a practice of law enforcement” 
that had, until then, been “banned by the courts.”71 
B.  Early Assessments of Title III by Policymakers  
and Law Enforcement 
In the decade after Title III’s passage, most policymakers came 
to view the wiretap law as a successful balance between law 
enforcement and privacy. One of Title III’s compromise provisions 
was the creation of a National Wiretap Commission.72 The 
Commission’s 1976 report on state and federal wiretapping offered a 
mostly positive assessment of Title III’s effects on law enforcement 
and privacy.73 The Report offered the following conclusions: 
 
 66. Id. § 2518(5). 
 67. Id. § 2518(8)(d). 
 68. Id. § 2515. 
 69. Id. § 2520. 
 70. See James X. Dempsey, Communications Privacy in the Digital Age: Revitalizing the 
Federal Wiretap Laws to Enhance Privacy, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 65, 75 (1997) (“Wiretapping 
is no longer confined to violent and major crimes. Although Congress recognized in 1968 that 
wiretapping was an extraordinary technique that should be used only for especially serious crimes, 
the list of offenses for which wiretapping is permitted has been expanded steadily ever since . . . . 
[W]iretapping is now authorized for cases involving false statements on passport applications and 
loan applications or involving ‘any depredation’ against any property of the United States.”). 
 71. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 163 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2225. 
 72. Id. at xiii. 
 73. Id. 
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• “A majority of the Commission vigorously reaffirmed . . . 
that electronic surveillance is an indispensable aid to law 
enforcement . . . .”74 
• “[T]he procedural requirements of Title III have 
effectively minimized the invasion of individual privacy 
in electronic surveillance investigations by law 
enforcement officers.”75 
• “A majority of the Commission concluded that electronic 
surveillance could be used with significant success in the 
investigation of Federal crimes not now included in the 
enumerated crimes of Section 2516 of Title III . . . .”76 
Not everyone shared these beliefs. A “substantial minority” of the 
Commission, viewing the same evidence as the majority, concluded 
that wiretapping only played a successful role in a limited number of 
cases.77 Furthermore, this minority concluded that eight years of 
legalized government wiretapping had “discouraged” law 
enforcement’s use of traditional investigative techniques and still 
resulted in “substantial invasions of personal privacy.”78 
In sum, prior to 1968, the country periodically experimented with 
banning law enforcement wiretapping. The Communications Act 
meant to outlaw it, Attorneys General periodically gave it up, and 
evidence obtained from it could not be used in court. Despite growing 
awareness of surveillance abuses in the civil rights and Vietnam War 
era,79 Congress authorized regulated wiretapping via Title III, and law 
enforcement hasn’t looked back. Initially policymakers viewed the 
legislation as a successful balancing.80 However, as the next Part 
explains, in the years following Title III’s passage, the number of taps 
has expanded significantly, electronic communications may now be 
wiretapped in vast quantity even though the resulting privacy 
 
 74. Id. at xiv. 
 75. Id. at xvi. 
 76. Id. at xiii. The Report also stated that Title III had decreased the number of wiretaps in 
some states immediately following the law’s passage, though these findings were based on 
anecdotes rather than data. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Anglo-American Privacy and Surveillance, 96 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1059, 1091 (“Between 1965 and 1974, the legislature held forty-seven hearings and 
issued reports on privacy-related issues.”). 
 80. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at xiii (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2225. 
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intrusions are more severe, and the remedies for illegal surveillance 
are hard to obtain. 
III.  TITLE III HAS NOT NARROWLY RESTRICTED THE 
USE OF WIRETAPPING 
The frequency of wiretapping has increased dramatically since 
Title III was enacted. Where law enforcement agencies conducted a 
few hundred wiretaps in 1968, they now conduct thousands of 
wiretaps each year.81 Moreover, according to data published by the 
U.S. courts, a single wiretap today can sweep in millions of 
communications.82 While this increase may partly reflect changing 
communication habits, there is no question that the use of wiretapping 
has become far more routine in criminal investigations.83 Over the 
intervening decades, Congress has expanded the list of predicate 
offenses that are eligible for wiretaps thirty-one times.84 What was 
originally an investigative tool reserved primarily for national security 
and organized crime investigations, can now be used to investigate a 
vast range of offenses. 
 
 81. Title III Wiretap Orders - Stats, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., 
https://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/wiretap_stats.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2019). 
 82. Wiretap Report 2018, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/wiretap-
report-2018 (last updated Dec. 31, 2018) (“The federal wiretap with the most intercepts occurred 
during a narcotics investigation in the Southern District of Texas and resulted in the interception of 
9,208,906 messages in 120 days.”). 
 83. Infra app. A. 
 84. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2516 (West 2018). 
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 85. See Title III Wiretap Orders - Stats, supra note 81 (source of data for years 1968–2016); 
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Table 1: Federal and State Wiretaps Prior to 196886 
 
Year Number of  
Wiretaps 
1940    687 
1944    51788 
1952    28589 
1953    30090 
1954    32291 
 
Using data published by the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts, Chart 1 shows the rise in the use of wiretapping in the 
five decades since Congress enacted Title III.92 
To assess the extent to which wiretaps are used to intercept 
Americans’ private conversations, however, one must also look at 
another important measure: the number of communications collected 
in the course of individual wiretaps. The average number of 
intercepted communications has steadily increased since 1977.93 In 
that year, the average number of communications intercepted was 
658.94 By 2007 and 2017, those numbers had increased to 3,106 and 
5,989 respectively.95 In 2016, a single wiretap resulted in the 
interception of 3,292,285 conversations or messages.96 As noted 
above, this increasing trend is likely a partial function of the changes 
in the types of devices subject to wiretapping and the use of new 
 
 86. Wiretap data from before 1968 is sporadic and limited to offhand disclosures in 
congressional hearings and committee reports. 
 87. NWC Report, supra note 1, at 36. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Levi Testimony, supra note 37, at 86. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Title III Wiretap Orders - Stats, supra note 81. 
 93. Infra app. A. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Wiretap Report 2016, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/wiretap-
report-2016 (last updated Dec. 31, 2016). 
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communications technologies, such as text-based messaging.97 As a 
result, today’s statistics show that wiretaps result in the collection of a 
staggering number of communications. 
Despite the statute’s reporting requirements, some scholars have 
raised concerns that the official number of wiretaps is inaccurately 
low.98 Recently, companies have started publishing “transparency 
reports” about the number and nature of government demands to 
access their users’ data.99 AT&T, Verizon, Sprint, and T-Mobile 
publish such reports.100 In aggregate, just these four companies state 
that they implemented three times as many wiretaps as the total 
number reported by the Administrative Office of the Courts.101 
B.  The List of Predicate Offenses for Wiretapping Has Expanded 
Following Title III’s passage, Congress wasted little time in 
expanding the number and categories of crimes that could justify 
wiretapping. In 1968, nearly all of the twenty-four categories of 
offenses listed in Title III had a clear relationship to national security 
or organized crime.102 Since then, Congress has amended 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2516—the section of Title III that enumerates wiretap-worthy 
offenses—thirty-one times.103 By 2018, § 2516(c) authorized wiretaps 
for cases relating to: “transportation for illegal sexual activity and 
related crimes”; “failure to appear” in court; “mail fraud”; “computer 
fraud and abuse”; “reproduction of naturalization or citizenship 
papers”; and “false statements in passport applications.”104 
Investigations into obscenity105 and theft of medical products106 now 
qualify, too. 
 
 97. See Dempsey, supra note 70, at 78–80. 
 98. See Albert Gidari, Wiretap Numbers Don’t Add Up, JUST SECURITY (July 6, 2015), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/24427/wiretap-numbers-add. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id.; Albert Gidari, Wiretap Numbers Still Don’t Add Up, STAN. L. SCH.: CTR. FOR 
INTERNET & SOC’Y (Nov. 29, 2016, 11:15 AM), 
https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2016/11/wiretap-numbers-still-dont-add. 
 102. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2516(a) (effective June 19, 1968) (authorizing wiretaps in investigations 
“relating to treason”); id. § 2516(c) (authorizing wiretaps in investigations relating to “bribery of 
public officials and witnesses”). 
 103. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2516 (West 2018). 
 104. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(c) (2012). 
 105. Id. § 2516(i). 
 106. Id. § 2516(s). 
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In 1969 and 1977, wiretaps were used most often to investigate 
gambling offenses, making up 30 to 40 percent of the totals, but drug-
related offenses were a close second.107 Since then, drug-related 
offenses have consistently taken the lead, making up roughly 50 to 
80 percent of intercept orders and applications from 1987 to the 
present.108 
C.  Title III’s “Necessity” Requirement Has Not 
Been Strictly Enforced 
Title III requires that every wiretap application include a 
statement as to other investigative procedures used prior to the 
application and why other investigative procedures reasonably appear 
unlikely to succeed, or are too dangerous to be tried.109 This provision, 
known as the necessity requirement, is “designed to assure that 
wiretapping is not resorted to in situations where traditional 
investigative techniques would suffice to expose the crime.”110 
Courts of appeals, however, have not applied the necessity 
requirement to require a showing that all possible alternatives have 
failed or are not reasonably likely to succeed. The requirement has 
proved to be more of an opportunity for reflection than an actual 
limitation on unnecessary use of a highly invasive investigative 
technique.111 The Seventh Circuit, for example, has stated that 
“[w]iretaps do not have to be used only as a last resort in an 
investigation,” as “[t]he evil” that the necessity requirement is 
intended to avoid is only “the routine use of wiretaps as an initial step 
in the investigation.”112 For that reason, the court held that “the 
government’s burden of proving necessity is not extraordinarily high, 
and our view is not hyper-technical.”113 Other appeals courts have 
 
 107. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT ON APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS 
AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE OR ORAL COMMUNICATIONS tbl. 3 
(1978); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT ON APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS 
AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE OR ORAL COMMUNICATIONS tbl. 2 
(1970); infra app. A. 
 108. Infra app. A. 
 109. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). 
 110. United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153 n.12 (1974). 
 111. See United States v. Pacheco, 489 F.2d 554, 565 (5th Cir. 1974) (“[T]he purpose of the 
requirement in section 2518(1)(c) is not to foreclose electronic surveillance until every other 
imaginable method of investigation has been unsuccessfully attempted, but simply to inform the 
issuing judge of the difficulties involved in the use of conventional techniques.”). 
 112. United States v. Fudge, 325 F.3d 910, 919 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 113. Id. 
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similarly concluded that the government’s burden to demonstrate 
necessity “is not great.”114 “All that is required [from the government] 
is that the investigators give serious consideration to the non-wiretap 
techniques prior to applying for wiretap authority and that the court be 
informed of the reasons for the investigators’ belief that such non-
wiretap techniques have been or will likely be inadequate.”115 
IV.  TITLE III’S PRIVACY PROTECTIONS HAVE ERODED OVER TIME 
Finally, this Part explains how the various provisions in Title III 
that were meant to limit privacy intrusions, and to ensure that 
investigators complied with those protections, have significantly 
eroded over time. 
A.  Implementation of the Wiretap Act’s Minimization Requirement 
Title III mandates that law enforcement wiretaps “shall be 
conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of 
communications not otherwise subject to interception under this 
chapter.”116 Minimization is an important means to protect the privacy 
of innocent third parties. It also protects the privacy of individuals who 
are being investigated, implicitly acknowledging their humanity—a 
person may be suspected of breaking the law, but she still has a right 
to private conversations with her mother, doctor, etc. 
The minimization requirement, however, has not proven as strict 
or effective as some might suggest. In practice, courts have generally 
set a low bar in terms of what minimization requires and—as 
 
 114. United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 38 (3d Cir. 1975). 
 115. United States v. Alfano, 838 F.2d 158, 163–164 (6th Cir. 1988); see also United States v. 
Canales Gomez, 358 F.3d 1221, 1225–26 (9th Cir. 2004) (“wiretap should not ordinarily be the 
initial step in the investigation” but “law enforcement officials need not exhaust every conceivable 
alternative before obtaining a wiretap” (citation omitted)); United States v. Santana, 342 F.3d 60, 
65 (1st Cir. 2003) (“government need not demonstrate that it exhausted all investigative 
procedures”); United States v. Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 1997) (the 
“‘necessity’ requirement of Title III is not an ‘exhaustion’ requirement,” and “law enforcement 
officials are not required to exhaust all other conceivable investigative procedures before resorting 
to wiretapping” (citation omitted)); United States v. Garcia, 785 F.2d 214, 223 (8th Cir. 1986) 
(wiretap application “need not explain away all possible alternative techniques because 
investigators are not required to use wiretaps or eavesdropping devices only as a last resort”); 
United States v. Pacheco, 489 F.2d 554,at 565 (5th Cir. 1974) (purpose of the exhaustion 
requirement is “simply to inform the issuing judge of the difficulties involved in the use of 
conventional techniques”). 
 116. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2012). 
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discussed further below—courts rarely require suppression even when 
they find that the minimization requirement has been violated. 
Courts give law enforcement significant leeway in what they are 
required to minimize. In the seminal case examining the minimization 
requirement, the Supreme Court declined to enumerate clear 
guidelines regarding minimization, instead emphasizing that the 
reasonableness of an officer’s efforts to minimize wiretapped 
communications “will depend on the facts and circumstances of each 
case.”117 Though the officers in that case had intercepted “virtually 
all” of the target’s conversations, only 40 percent of which were 
related to the criminal investigation, the Court rejected petitioners’ bid 
for suppression.118 Justices Brennan and Marshall, in dissent, 
criticized the opinion as contributing to a “process of myopic, 
incremental denigration of Title III’s safeguards.”119 Courts since have 
given law enforcement a lot of leeway in satisfying the minimization 
requirement, even when investigators recorded and retained 
innocent—or even clearly privileged—conversations, such as 
conversations with lawyers or doctors.120 
Minimization may be even more lax in the context of “electronic 
communications.” In 1986, the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act (ECPA) amended Title III to extend its privacy protections to 
“electronic” as well as “wire” and “oral” communications.121 It is not 
entirely clear how the minimization requirement functions in the 
electronic context because the type of real-time minimization required 
 
 117. Id. at 140. 
 118. Id. at 132, 143. 
 119. Id. at 148 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 120. See, e.g., United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 800, 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (interception 
of calls between defendant and his wife, lawyer, and doctor were unreasonable, but the government 
nonetheless observed proper minimization overall); see also United States v. Scurry, 821 F.3d 1, 
18 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (rejecting minimization challenge on the grounds that “to challenge the 
reasonableness of the government’s minimization efforts, a party must present more than the raw 
number of non-pertinent intercepted calls and their durations”); United States v. Charles, 213 F.3d 
10, 21–23 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding that minimization of phone calls involving attorneys was 
sufficient based on (1) the nature and complexity of the suspected crimes, (2) the thoroughness of 
the government precautions to bring about minimization, and (3) the degree of judicial supervision 
over the surveillance practices); United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.3d 1294, 1307 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(rejecting minimization challenge where officers intercepted innocent calls because the 
investigation “involved factors such as the presence of ambiguous or coded language, a conspiracy 
thought to be widespread, and the fact that the phone tapped was located in the residence of a person 
thought to be the head of a major drug ring”). 
 121. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (1986), Pub. L. 99–508. 
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for wiretapped telephone calls cannot easily be applied to electronic 
communications. As stated in the ECPA Senate Report: 
[T]he technology used to either transmit or intercept an 
electronic message such as electronic mail or a computer data 
transmission ordinarily will not make it possible to shut 
down the interception and taping or recording equipment 
simultaneously in order to minimize in the same manner as 
with a wire interception. It is impossible to ‘listen’ to a 
computer and determine when to stop listening and minimize 
as it is possible to do in listening to a telephone conversation. 
For instance, a page displayed on a screen during a computer 
transmission might have five paragraphs of which the second 
and third are relevant to the investigation and the others are 
not. The printing technology is such that the whole page 
including the irrelevant paragraphs, would have to be printed 
and read, before anything can be done about minimization.122 
The Report contemplated that because “minimization for computer 
transmissions would require a somewhat different procedure than that 
used to minimize a telephone call, . . . the minimization should be 
conducted by the initial law enforcement officials who review the 
transcript.”123 It would then be the role of those officials to “delete all 
non-relevant materials and disseminate to other officials only that 
information which is relevant to the investigation.”124 
Cases examining the minimization requirement in the context of 
electronic communications appear to be rare. Based on the limited 
amount of information available on minimization in the context of 
electronic wiretaps, it seems that generally, law enforcement collects 
all of the intercepted electronic communications, which a designated 
officer then reviews in order to identify and segregate the pertinent 
communications.125 There are no authorities making clear how 
 
 122. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 31. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ELEC. SURVEILLANCE MANUAL: PROCEDURES AND CASE LAW 
FORMS 14 (2005), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal/legacy/2014/10/29/elec-sur-
manual.pdf (stating that “[a]fter-the-fact minimization is a necessity for the interception of 
electronic communications such as cell phone or pager text messages, facsimile transmissions, and 
internet transmissions such as e-mail and images,” and explaining that “[i]n such cases, all 
communications are recorded and then examined by a monitoring agent and/or a supervising 
attorney to determine their relevance to the investigation,” and that “[d]isclosure is then limited to 
those communications by the subjects or their confederates that are criminal in nature”); see also 
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electronic communications that investigators initially deem non-
pertinent are treated—i.e., whether they are deleted, sealed in some 
fashion, retained by the original investigators, or made available for 
subsequent querying.126 In sum, permitting seizure of communications 
in their entirety and letting law enforcement sort out the material for 
which there is probable cause afterward creates the opportunity for far-
wider reaching privacy invasions. 
The infrequency of court cases applying the minimization 
requirement to wiretaps of electronic communications may be due 
both to inadequacy of notice to affected individuals and to the fact that 
ECPA did not extend Title III’s statutory suppression remedy to 
electronic communications. Moreover, even when the minimization 
requirement is violated in the context of telephone calls, courts rarely 
require suppression (as discussed further in suppression section 
below), and the statute provides no civil remedy. In the majority of 
cases, there are no consequences to investigators for a failure to 
effectively minimize. 
B.  Implementation of the Wiretap Act’s Notice Provisions 
The Wiretap Act requires that the court inform an individual who 
is the target of a wiretap application about the “fact” and “date” of the 
wiretap, and whether “wire or electronic communications” were or 
were not intercepted.127 Notice is supposed to occur “[w]ithin a 
reasonable time but no later than ninety days” after the wiretap, unless 
a judge allows for postponing notice.128 Title III further provides that 
a judge may determine in his or her discretion that it is “in the interest 
of justice” to require notice to individuals whose communications are 
 
United States v. McGuire, 307 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2002) (regarding an electronic wiretap of a fax, 
law enforcement need not mimic minimization of telephone calls by skipping lines if a fax appeared 
non-pertinent; rather, law enforcement may look at every communication collected by an electronic 
wiretap and then separate out non-pertinent communication); United States v. Harvey, No. 4:02-
00482-JCH-DDN, 2003 WL 22052993, at *8 (E.D. Mo. July 28, 2003) (describing minimization 
process by which email communications were intercepted, copied in their entirety, stored, and 
reviewed by designated personnel to determine whether communications appeared pertinent to 
criminal activity, with non-pertinent communications then sealed and made unavailable to the 
investigators). 
 126. See, e.g., United States v. Ganias, 824 F.3d 199 (2d. Cir. 2016) (non-responsive materials 
seized pursuant to a November 2003 warrant still in law enforcement possession and available for 
querying in April 2006). 
 127. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2012). 
 128. Id. § 2518(8)(d). 
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incidentally overheard.129 Notice is critical for public transparency, 
oversight, and accountability. Finally, Title III also requires notice to 
any party in a trial or legal proceeding where the government intends 
to introduce the contents of an intercepted communication “or 
evidence derived therefrom.”130 
Because wiretaps are conducted in secret, notice is crucial for 
accountability. Without notice, individuals who have been subject to 
unlawful wiretaps are generally unable to pursue the remedies for 
violations of Title III or the Fourth Amendment. 
However, some courts have held that notice to the electronic 
service provider, and not to the intercepted parties, is adequate.131 
Despite the importance of this procedural safeguard, the extent to 
which courts require notice to individuals who are incidentally 
overheard is unclear because most jurisdictions do not appear to 
collect or publish data. Similarly, the extent to which federal and state 
authorities comply with the statute’s notice requirement—both for 
those who are targeted and those who are incidentally overheard—is 
difficult to assess.132 While the federal government keeps records 
regarding instances of wiretapping,133 these records do not provide 
information about whether notices were sent to those who have been 
wiretapped.134 As a result, publicly available information about 
wiretap notices derives mostly from individuals and attorneys sharing 
their firsthand accounts.135 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. § 2518(9). 
 131. In re United States, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1221–22 (D. Or. 2009). 
 132. For example, the Department of Justice has refused to disclose how it interprets Title III’s 
requirement that it provide notice to criminal defendants when evidence is “derived” from a 
wiretap. An unjustifiably narrow interpretation of this requirement would allow the government to 
conceal wiretaps in criminal cases, depriving individuals who face prosecution of the opportunity 
to challenge those wiretaps and the resulting evidence. In 2016, DOJ sent all federal prosecutors a 
policy memorandum titled, “Determining Evidence is ‘Derived From’ Surveillance Under Title III 
or FISA.” Although this memorandum sets forth DOJ’s official interpretation of its duty to provide 
notice, DOJ has refused to release the document publicly. See Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Am. 
Civil Liberties Union v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 4:17-cv-03571-JSW, 2019 WL 2619664 (N.D. Cal. 
Apr. 15, 2019). 
 133. Wiretap Report 2017, supra note 85. 
 134. Fred P. Graham, Can You Find Out if Your Telephone Is Tapped?, ESQUIRE (May 1973), 
http://www.bugsweeps.com/info/esquire_5-73.html. 
 135. Bill Torpy, DeKalb Wiretap Notices Causing Consternation, ATLANTA J.-CONST. 
(Sept. 7, 2013), https://www.ajc.com/news/local-govt—politics/dekalb-wiretap-notices-causing-
consternation/OoH4BnUGlzUBB7GerWP1JI/; Jeff German, DA Sends 230 Wiretap Notices Amid 
Nevada Assembly Extortion Probe, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (June 10, 2015, 2:39 PM), 
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Similarly, most states that have their own wiretap provisions and 
notice regulations decline to publish records of wiretap notices. 
California appears to be the only state that makes data concerning the 
number “inventory notices” provided publicly available—and even 
California’s records do not appear to go back before 2009.136 
California’s reports show that, in many instances, only a small 
fraction of the individuals whose communications are intercepted 
receive notice that they were subject to surveillance.137 For example, 
in 2018, one series of wiretaps intercepted the communications of 
1,739 people—ensnaring 91,111 communications in the process—but 
notice was given to only 345 individuals.138 
Without notice, people whose communications have been 
intercepted have no way of knowing that investigators have listened 
in on their private conversations and no way of determining whether 
that intrusion was lawful or not. Similarly, without notice, the public 
has limited ability to oversee and to incentivize careful use of 
wiretapping. 
C.  Implementation of Title III’s Suppression Remedy 
1.  Congressional Intent and Statutory Background 
To incentivize compliance with the Wiretap Act’s requirements, 
the statute includes a mandatory suppression remedy.139 The Wiretap 
Act’s legislative history indicates that Congress believed the 
suppression remedy was necessary to protect privacy and enforce the 
Act’s limitations. Congress was clear that the prohibition on 
unauthorized interception “must be enforced with all appropriate 
sanctions.”140 Congress explained that “[t]he perpetrator [of unlawful 




 136. Publications, ST. OF CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., https://oag.ca.gov/publications#electronic (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2019). 
 137. Due to the timing of these annual reports, it can be difficult to determine the degree to 
which notice was ultimately provided to affected individuals, if at all, because delayed notice orders 
remained in effect when the report was issued. This gap represents another flaw in the available 
data. 
 138. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. CALIFORNIA ELECTRONICS INTERCEPTIONS REPORT 7, 
30 (2018), https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/publications/annual-rept-legislature-
2018.pdf (providing statistics for interception number 2019-CC-19). 
 139. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2012). 
 140. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 69 (1968). 
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and criminal proceedings.”141 The suppression remedy was intended 
to “sharply curtail the unlawful interception of wire and oral 
communications.”142 The legislative history also suggests that the 
remedy was meant to reflect constitutional interpretations of 
suppression remedies as they existed at the time. Congress sought to 
roughly codify the “suppression role” as it was understood in the 
prevailing “search and seizure law” in 1968.143 
2.  Implementation with Regard to Wire and Oral Communications 
Since the Wiretap Act’s enactment, judicial interpretations have 
narrowed the suppression remedy’s scope in three ways. Although 
some of these interpretations parallel efforts to narrow the judicially 
created exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment violations, the 
Wiretap Act’s suppression remedy has an independent basis in the 
statute.144 As a result, some of these rulings appear at odds with the 
compulsory language of the Wiretap Act145 and with Congress’s view 
that suppression would be an integral remedy to protect privacy.146 
First, some circuits have grafted the Fourth Amendment’s good-
faith exception onto the Wiretap Act’s statutory suppression 
remedy.147 They have done this even though the Supreme Court case 
that established the good-faith exception, United States v. Leon,148 
came after the 1968 Wiretap Act, and thus Congress could not have 
intended to incorporate it. 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 96 (citing Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954)). 
 144. 18 U.S.C. § 2515. 
 145. Id. §§ 2515, 2518(10)(a). 
 146. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 69. 
 147. See, e.g., United States v. Brewer, 204 F. App’x 205, 208 (4th Cir. 2006) (reasoning that 
Fourth Amendment good-faith exception can justify rejection of an otherwise valid suppression 
motion); United States v. Moore, 41 F.3d 370, 376 (8th Cir. 1994) (acknowledging that the Leon 
good faith exception pertains to the Fourth Amendment, but interpreting the legislative history of 
the Wiretap Act as instructing courts to “adopt suppression principles developed in Fourth 
Amendment cases”). But see United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 524 (1974) (where there 
exists a statutory suppression remedy, the terms of the statute govern, as opposed to the terms of 
the “judicially fashioned” Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule); United States v. Glover, 736 F.3d 
509, 515–16 (D.C. Cir. 2013); United States v. Rice, 478 F.3d 704, 711–13 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding 
that the good faith exception does not apply to Wiretap Act suppression motions due to differences 
between legislative and judicial exclusionary rules); United States v. Spadaccino, 800 F.2d 292, 
296 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 148. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
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Second, some courts have developed a plain view-type exception 
for the suppression remedy. In United States v. Carey,149 the FBI 
obtained an intercept order for a particular individual’s phone number, 
but the FBI later learned the phone was used by another person.150 
Before realizing the error, the FBI intercepted a number of 
incriminating phone calls.151 The user of the phone, after being 
charged with a crime based on some of the intercepted 
communications, moved to suppress the evidence because the 
intercept order related to a separate individual.152 Relying on the plain 
view doctrine from Fourth Amendment case law, the court reasoned 
that incriminating evidence obtained prior to the discovery that the 
target was not using the phone was admissible.153 
Third, the Supreme Court has instructed lower courts to 
distinguish between “material” and “immaterial” deviations from the 
warrant requirements.154 That has created two classes of statutory 
violations—ones that lead to suppression, and ones that do not. Only 
a “failure to satisfy any of those statutory requirements that directly 
and substantially implement the congressional intention to limit the 
use of intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the 
employment of [the] extraordinary investigative device” justify 
suppression.155 
Similarly, in Scott v. United States,156 the Court rejected the 
petitioners’ argument that an agent’s failure to make subjective, good-
faith efforts to comply with minimization procedures required 
suppression.157 The Court held that courts should look only to agents’ 
actions, not motives, and those actions should be evaluated based on a 
reasonableness requirement.158 The Court further noted that the 
interception of a high number of non-incriminating calls is not in itself 
sufficient to show a failure to comply with minimization 
 
 149. 836 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 150. Id. at 1094. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See also United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849, 851 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 154. United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974). 
 155. Id. (quoting United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 526 (1974)). 
 156. 436 U.S. 128 (1978). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 139–40. 
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procedures.159 It is odd that good faith can justify dispensing with the 
suppression remedy, but bad faith doesn’t warrant suppression. 
There does not appear to be any empirical research on the number 
of suppression motions that are granted or denied. Recently, the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts began publishing 
data, as part of its statutory reporting requirements, that shows whether 
suppression motions are pending, denied, or granted in cases where 
intercepts led to arrests and criminal proceedings.160 But this 
information appears to be incomplete because it depends on reports 
filed by prosecutors. 
One clear trend in interpretations of the suppression remedy, 
however, is that many courts have diluted the strength of this remedy 
over time. For example, as discussed above, some circuit courts have 
created a good-faith exception, borrowing from Fourth Amendment 
case law that did not exist when Congress passed the Wiretap Act.161 
As the Supreme Court appears to be increasingly hostile to the 
exclusionary rule, the statutory suppression remedy could be further 
diluted. 
3.  No Suppression Remedy for Illegal Interception of 
Electronic Communications 
Congress, also, has declined to extend the statute’s suppression 
remedy to new types of communications.162 While a person may move 
to suppress “the contents of any wire or oral communication” 
intercepted pursuant to Title III, or evidence derived therefrom, if the 
wiretap did not comply with Title III’s requirements, no such remedy 
exists in regards to the contents of electronic communications.163 The 
decision not to extend the suppression remedy to electronic 
communications was, according to the Senate Report, made “as a 
result of discussions with the Justice Department.”164 
 
 159. Id. at 140. 
 160. See, e.g., Table Wire A1—Appendix Tables Wiretap, U.S. CTS. (Dec. 31, 2018), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/wire-a1/wiretap/2018/12/31. 
 161. E.g., United States v. Brewer, 204 F. App’x 205, 208 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 162. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 23 (1986). 
 163. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (2012) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Steiger, 318 
F.3d 1039, 1052 (11th Cir. 2003) (“The Wiretap Act does not provide a suppression remedy for 
electronic communications unlawfully acquired under the Act.”); Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. 
U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 461 n.6 (5th Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Meriwether, 917 
F.2d 955, 960 (6th Cir. 1990) (same). 
 164. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 23 (1986). 
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The absence of a mandatory suppression remedy under the statute 
reduces the government’s incentive to comply with the statutory 
safeguards and may disincentivize criminal defendants from litigating 
privacy rights in electronic communications, potentially masking 
illegal surveillance that affects other private citizens. 
D.  Civil Remedies and Criminal Penalties 
While Congress has long recognized the importance of providing 
civil remedies to victims of Wiretap Act violations and imposing 
criminal sanctions on violators, the remedies provided are primarily 
directed at private citizens who engage in unlawful wiretapping.165 
They do little to disincentivize violations by law enforcement except 
in the most egregious cases. 
In enacting the Wiretap Act, Congress recognized that “[i]t is not 
enough . . . just to prohibit the unjustifiable interception, disclosure, or 
use of any wire or oral communications.”166 “Criminal penalties have 
their part to play.”167 Accordingly, a Wiretap Act violation is a Class 
D felony, and, subject to specific exceptions, violations of the Act may 
result in fines and/or imprisonment for up to five years.168 Congress 
also noted that “remedies must be afforded the victim of an unlawful 
invasion of privacy,” including “civil recourse.”169 Victims of Wiretap 
Act violations may therefore generally seek equitable or declaratory 
relief and damages from violators.170 
The exact contours of the civil remedy have changed over time. 
For example, the civil remedy originally provided for a civil suit for 
injunctive relief and damages against “any person” who violated the 
Wiretap Act, then extended liability to “any person or entity,” and later 
narrowed the scope of the remedy contained in section 2520 to provide 
a cause of action against “any person or entity, other than the United 
States.”171 Today, civil suits for money damages against the United 
States for Wiretap Act violations are authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 2712. 
 
 165. See Pub. L. No. 107-56, Oct. 26, 2001, 115 Stat. 272 (extending liability under the Wiretap 
Act to “any person or entity, other than the United States”). 
 166. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2156 (1968). 
 167. Id. 
 168. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (setting penalties); id. § 3559(a)(4) (classifying sentence). 
 169. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2156 (1968). 
 170. See 18 U.S.C. § 2520. 
 171. Compare Pub. L. No. 90-351, June 19, 1968, 82 Stat. 197 (“any person”), with Pub. L. No. 
99-508, Oct. 21, 1986, 100 Stat. 1848 (“any person or entity”), and Pub. L. No. 107-56, Oct. 26, 
2001, 115 Stat. 272 (“any person or entity, other than the United States”). 
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Nonetheless, neither the civil nor criminal remedies have functioned 
to effectively remedy the vast majority of Wiretap Act violations by 
government actors. 
This is partly due to carve-outs that shield government actors 
from liability except for the most flagrant violations of the statute. 
Most notably, good faith is a complete defense against any criminal or 
civil action, providing a safe harbor for law enforcement officers and 
individuals acting at the behest of law enforcement officers who act in 
good faith reliance on legal process, such as a court warrant or 
order.172 Accordingly, remedies are unlikely to apply where law 
enforcement officers obtain a court order, so long as the officer had a 
reasonable, good-faith belief that he acted legally pursuant to a court 
order.173 Civil remedies are generally off the table when officers have 
a court order but subsequently violate the Act’s core requirements, 
such as by failing to minimize the collection of private 
communications.174 Additionally, the Act’s prohibition on the use of a 
“device” to intercept an oral communication explicitly excepts devices 
that are “used by an investigative or law enforcement officer in the 
ordinary course of his duties.”175 In addition, to the extent that the 
government fails to provide notice of wiretapping to targets or others, 
victims of unlawful wiretaps have no way to even attempt to obtain a 
remedy. Perhaps for this reason, the civil remedy provisions that 
theoretically allow victims to seek remedies for wiretap violations are 
rarely utilized against government actors. 
Further, it appears that criminal prosecutions are initiated against 
government actors for Wiretap Act violations only in cases of blatant 
abuse—for example, where a law enforcement officer has forged 
wiretap orders to spy on a love interest.176 
Ultimately, then, while private actors who violate the Wiretap Act 
may face civil or criminal penalties, law enforcement officials who 
 
 172. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(d); see GINA STEVENS & CHARLES DOYLE, PRIVACY: AN OVERVIEW 
OF FEDERAL STATUTES GOVERNING WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING 18–19 
(2003), https://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/98-326.pdf. 
 173. Jacobson v. Rose, 592 F.2d 515, 523 (9th Cir. 1978). A defendant may assert a good-faith 
defense where: (1) “he had a subjective good faith belief that he acted legally pursuant to a court 
order”; and (2) “this belief was reasonable.” Id. 
 174. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(d)(1). 
 175. Id. § 2510(5)(a)(ii). 
 176. See Staci Zaretsky, Ex-Prosecutor Disbarred for Forging Wiretap Orders to Spy on Love 
Interest, ABOVE L. (Jan. 4, 2018), https://abovethelaw.com/2018/01/ex-prosecutor-disbarred-for-
forging-wiretap-orders-to-spy-on-love-interest/. 
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violate the statute or court wiretapping orders face few effective 
penalties. 
V.  GOING FORWARD 
Going forward, advocates should be aware that a Title III-style 
super-warrant is not a panacea for privacy concerns—and may 
ultimately expand the use of an invasive investigative technique by 
legitimizing it. As the experience with wiretapping shows, initially 
strong limits can quickly erode. Merely parroting current Title III 
language in legislative proposals will not constitute strong limits, 
given current judicial interpretations of Title III. Should super-warrant 
procedures be considered, advocates will have to draft new language 
to effectively implement the intended safeguards behind Title III. In 
particular: 
• The requirement that investigators show “necessity” 
before employing an intrusive technique should be 
demanding and should rely on clear, objective criteria. 
• Minimization requirements should be strict, should 
impose concrete default rules, and should require that 
non-responsive data or data belonging to innocent third 
parties be promptly purged. 
• Notice to affected parties should be required by default. 
Judges should have to explain in writing, on the basis of 
case-specific facts, when there is an exception or when 
notice is temporarily delayed. The number of affected 
parties who receive and who do not receive notice should 
be tracked and publicly reported. 
• Statutory suppression remedies should be clearly defined 
and, where appropriate, should be stated in unambiguous, 
mandatory terms. A statute should be precise in 
identifying the specific violations that can justify 
suppression. A statute should also be clear that its 
suppression remedy is independent of any Fourth 
Amendment remedies or exceptions. A statute may have 
to state, for example, that there is no good-faith exception. 
• A statute may need to provide for civil remedies and 
provide standing to sue. 
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• Transparency reporting may often be helpful, but it is far 
from sufficient in preventing the widespread use of novel 
surveillance techniques. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The raw number of wiretap orders has increased dramatically 
since 1968. At the same time, the limitations built into the statute have 
been watered down or have otherwise proven to be less effective over 
time than many may assume at first glance. This history offers critical 
lessons as privacy advocates and policymakers consider regulations 
for face surveillance, familial DNA searches, government hacking, 
and other new surveillance technologies. The history of American 
wiretap law suggests that existing Wiretap Act protections are not a 
turn-key model for mitigating privacy risks in the face of new 
surveillance technologies. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Wiretap Report Data Comparison Sample 
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 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. STAT. ANALYSIS & REP. DIVISION, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT ON 
APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE, ORAL, 
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Wiretap Report Data Comparison Sample (continued) 
Category 2017183 2007184 1997185 1987186 1977187 1969188 
Average Number of 
Persons Intercepted 
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